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WTO claims: evolving issues
Zeina Ahmad and Bashar H. Malkawi
College of Law, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Abstract
Purpose – The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the best dispute settlement mechanisms in the
world. Under WTO rules, aggrieved parties must establish a “prima facie” case before the panel can call on
the offending party to respond to the claims. The objective of the present study is to critically evaluate the
application of the concept of burden of proof underWTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the rule of “prima facie” in WTO jurisprudence.
To do so, the ﬁrst part will focus on the development of dispute settlement within WTO. The second part is
divided into several subsections that will focus on the burden of proof concept, burden of proof in common
law, burden of proof in civil law and the prima facie standard.
Findings – The DSU does not explicitly regulate how to allocate the burden of proof, but panels and the AB
needed to address that issue early in their history. Despite this, all aggrieved parties to establish a prima facie
case before the case can become the subject of a panel hearing. There is a need to adopt a burden of proof
standard that assesses evidence on the basis of preponderance of the available evidence rather than on the
basis of a party’s failure to adduce evidence to back up or dispute a claim.
Originality/value – The paper is an attempt to address an important issue on the presentation of evidence
and proof in international litigation, i.e. WTO.
Keywords WTO, Dispute settlement, International trade, Burden of proof
Paper type General review
1. Introduction
Burden of proof, in the context of international adjudication, denotes the party to a dispute
who has the greatest risk of loss in the event that a fact or a proposition is not proven
(Kurleka and Turunen, 2010). Therefore, the concept of burden of proof allocates the
responsibility on the affected party to adduce sufﬁcient evidence to either prove or disprove
a claim (Pauwelyn, 1998). The tribunal adjudicating a case will base its decision on the
evidence that the affected party puts forth to support or refute a claim. The role that burden
of proof plays in determining the outcome of a dispute often implies that it has a direct
impact on the procedural aspects of a tribunal’s decision. Consequently, the tribunal must
always ensure that their decision is based on the facts that each party has presented, rather
than on their subjective assessment of each party’s arguments.
The general rule in issues of burden of proof is that the party seeking to prove a fact must
bear the responsibility of adducing the nature of evidence that will convince the tribunal to
accept his or her position regarding the issue in dispute and provide an award in his/her
favor (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 23). While this rule sounds simple and easy for all parties to
appreciate, the reality of the matter is that it is everything else but simple. In many cases of
international adjudication, the parties seeking to establish a claim often do not have access
to the types of evidence that will convince the tribunal to rule in their favor and make a
suitable award. In such cases, the parties are often left with a sense of injustice when the
tribunal adjudicating on their dispute comes to the conclusion that the evidence adduced is
insufﬁcient to warrant an award or a ruling in favor of the party. Common law attempted to
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remedy the situation through the introduction of concepts such as res ipsa loquitur in which
the burden shifts to the party with easy access to the evidence (Buckley and Okrent, 2003).
However, the rules of international tribunals do not give parties access to similar rules and,
as such, parties often face injustice whenever they are aggrieved, but lack sufﬁcient
evidence to prove their case.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the best dispute settlement mechanisms
in the world, but developing countries have experienced immense difﬁculty in maximizing
on the effectiveness of the institution because they lack the capacity to participate
effectively. Under WTO rules, aggrieved parties must establish a “prima facie” case before
the panel can call on the offending party to respond to the claims[1]. The rule regarding
“prima facie” implies that aggrieved parties must produce evidence that is sufﬁcient enough
to convince the panel that they are entitled to the requested remedies before the burden of
proof can shift to the offending party[1]. The burden of proof will never shift from the
aggrieved party to the offending party if the panel is not satisﬁed that the aggrieved party
has discharged that burden. The objective of the present study is to critically evaluate the
application of the concept of burden of proof underWTO dispute settlement mechanism.
The paper will be divided into two main parts. The ﬁrst part will focus on the
development of dispute settlement within WTO. This part will also outline the history of
dispute settlement at the WTO and the rules established to govern burden of proof. The
second part will focus on the burden of proof within the WTO dispute settlement system.
The second part will be divided into several subsections that will focus on the burden of
proof concept, burden of proof in common law, burden of proof in civil law and the prima
facie standard. Thereafter, the paper will conclude with a set of conclusions and
recommendations.
2. Development of theWorld Trade Organization dispute settlement
mechanism
The emergence of the WTO as an effective dispute resolution body came against the
backdrop of the ineffective The general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) dispute
settlement mechanism. The provisions in the GATT related to the settlement of disputes
were included in articles XXII and XXIII. The principles enshrined in the two articles were
based on the notion that formal legal actions were unfriendly and would unnecessarily
undermine international trade.
The European Communities advocated for a rule widely regarded as the diplomacy
rule[2]. The European Community adopted the pragmatic approach, which advocated for
the view that GATT dispute settlement framework should be perceived as a natural
outcome of the negotiation process (Tarullo, 1985). The USA, in contrast, adopted the
adjudication approach, which took the view that the GATT dispute settlement mechanism
that investigated violation of applicable treaties and subjected countries violating those
treaties to hefty sanctions (Jackson et al., 1995).
The GATT dispute settlement panels adopted an approach in which there was room for
the party in dispute to challenge any or all of the decisions of the dispute settlement body.
That approach was akin to the approach taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
which the validity and enforceability of a decision hinges on the whether the parties in
dispute have accepted the court’s jurisdiction on the matter (Alexandrov, 2006; Powell and
Mitchell, 2007; Llamazon, 2008). If one of the parties decides to reject its jurisdiction, then the
ruling would be unenforceable (Alexandrov, 2006; Powell and Mitchell, 2007; Llamazon,
2008). Similarly, there was a risk that the GATT dispute settlement body would face the
same risk of the body being used as an avenue for the settlement of political scores. The
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absence of a requirement or rule making the rulings of the body binding meant that the
disputing parties could override its ruling.
Unlike the GATT dispute settlement tribunals, the WTO dispute settlement system has
an unfettered dispute settlement authority. This not only implies thatWTO panels can settle
disputes betweenmembers but also implies that decisions ofWTO panels are binding on the
parties to the dispute and there are trade sanctions that the panel can impose out on
members that do not abide by its decisions (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 227). The debates about
jurisdiction that dogged the GATT dispute settlement body are non-existent under the
WTO dispute settlement framework.
These unfettered powers are enshrined under rules of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The DSU gives WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) the authority to settle disputes and prescribe trade sanctions for
states that contravene the rules contained under WTO agreements. The extent of the powers
of the WTO dispute settlement bodies is clearly outlined under article 2(1) of the DSU. Under
that article, the DSU establishes the DSB whose primary mandate will be to administer the
dispute settlement rules enshrined under the DSU[3]. Further, the DSU provides that the DSB
has the sole responsibility of establishing not only the panels that will adjudicate on disputes
instituted by member states but also the Appellate Body that will review the decision of the
panel whenever a party of a dispute is dissatisﬁed with the ruling of the tribunal[3].
Additionally, the DSB will have the sole mandate of supervising the implementation of the
DSU and supervising parties’ adherence to panel rulings.
Article 3 of the DSU provides further support to the provisions in article 2 by outlining
general rules that will govern dispute settlement under the WTO dispute settlement
mechanisms. The DSU states that the primary objective of the rules enshrined under the
DSU is to ensure predictability and security within the global trading system[4]. Further, the
DSU states that the dispute settlement mechanismwas developed because of member states’
realization that there was need for a system to safeguard their rights and clarify existing
rules[4]. Prompt settlement of dispute is a cornerstone of the dispute settlement mechanisms
established under the DSU[5].
The discussion above suggests that the member states, in establishing the dispute
settlement mechanisms under the WTO system, wanted to ensure that they had a
mechanism that could settle international trade disputes in a prompt manner so as to avoid
the disruption of trade (Palmeter andMavroidis, 2004).
3. Burden of proof inWorld Trade Organization law
When instituting disputes under the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, parties must
adhere to the rules set out in article 3(7) and article 3(8) of the DSU. According to the DSU,
the member state instituting the action must consider the merits of their case and determine
whether it will be fruitful1. The article goes on to state that the primary objective of the DSU
is to ensure prompt and fruitful resolution of disputes[1]. Although this provision does not
clearly outline the prima facie case, an analysis of its implication indicates that it requires all
aggrieved parties to establish a prima facie case before the case can become the subject of a
panel hearing.
The rule implies that panels will have the responsibility of dismissing frivolous disputes
or disputes whose evidence is so insufﬁcient that it does not warrant an award in favor of
the aggrieved party. The effect of article 3(7) is that it places the burden of proof on the
member state instituting the legal proceeding.
Once the DSB has established the panel, and it ﬁnds that the aggrieved member state has
established a prima facie case, the panel will call on the offending member state to respond
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to the complaint. This happens after both parties submit their submissions and make
arguments during the hearing. The panel will decide only at the end whether a complainant
met the burden of proof. Indeed, article 3(8) of the DSU clearly underscores this fact when it
states that the presence of clear evidence of an infringement of WTO rules will be an
indication that the aggrieved state has established a prima facie case that will give rise to a
nulliﬁcation of the action and the provision of an award. The article goes on to state that the
establishment of a prima facie case will automatically lead to an assumption that
the offending party has breached the stated WTO rules, and, as such, it will be upon the
offending state to adduce sufﬁcient evidence to rebut the claim[6]. The implication of this
article is that it acknowledges that the establishment of a prima facie case leads to a shift in
the burden of proof from the complainant to the defendant. The obligation of the offending
state will be to adduce evidence that is cogent enough to cast doubt on the aggrieved state’s
claims.
On the face of it, the DSU provisions on the burden of proof seem concise and clear.
However, a close analysis of those rules demonstrates that one important issue is missing.
The rules do not specify the standards of evidence that will be deemed “prima facie” and the
standards of evidence that will be deemed to have refuted the prima facie case established
by the aggrieved state. The rules merely state what the aggrieved state needs to establish to
obtain the remedy it desires, but they do not expressly state the quantity of the evidence that
the panel will deem as prima facie. The absence of clear rules on the standard of proof
implies that panels have the discretion to determine whether the evidence that the aggrieved
state submits meets the threshold for a prima facie case.
Additionally, the rules do not expressly outline the standards that the panel will use to
assess whether the offending state has satisﬁed its burden. The panel has the discretion to
decide these issues on a case by case basis, and it opens up the possibility of the panel
deciding on an issue in one way and later on deciding on a similar issue in a different way
(Kazazi, 1996). The decision to give the panel the leeway to make decisions on standards of
proof severely limits aggrieved state’s ability to obtain justice.
The limit imposed on aggrieved states is evidenced by the terms of reference of any
panel[7]. The DSU rules play an important role in determining the manner in which the
panel will interpret evidence adduced towards it. The DSU, under article 7(1), clearly
states that the parties to the dispute can establish the terms of reference that will govern
the operations of the panel. However, when the parties fail to establish the terms of
reference within 20 days, the rules under DSU will kick in, and they will be forced to rely
on the provisions of article 7 of the DSU. Article 7 of the DSU states that in the absence of
agreement between parties, the terms of reference for the panel will be to critically
evaluate the facts of the dispute from the prism of rules established under the DSU and
other covered WTO agreements and to make ﬁndings that will make it easier for the DSB
to decide the nature of punishment that ﬁts the offending state. The wording of article
7(1) implies that there is a window for parties to the dispute to decide the terms of
reference. The window is normally 20 days, but there is very little evidence, that there
will be consensus on the part of the offending state. The requirement of consensus among
the parties demonstrates that the most probable terms of reference that the panel will use
in the settlement of the dispute are the terms outlined in article 7(1).
4. Burden of proof inWorld Trade Organization jurisprudence
The burden of proof concept is an evidentiary principle that is important in all legal
systems. Under the WTO law, burden of proof usually rests on the state that seeks to prove
or disprove a claim related to the violation of GATT 1994[8]. The DSU, under article 3(8),
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enshrines the principle of burden of proof under WTO law. The article states that the
aggrieved member state must adduce evidence to demonstrate that it is entitled to the
remedy it is seeking[8]. Once the WTO panel has established that the evidence is sufﬁcient,
the burden of proof will shift from the aggrieved state to the state alleged to have committed
a violation of GATT 1994[8]. One of the important aspects of the burden of proof enshrined
under the DSU is the concept of “prima facie”. This concept implies that the evidence tabled
to support the aggrieved state’s claim must meet a given threshold for the tribunal to shift
the burden from the aggrieved state to the offending state. The threshold, according to the
DSU, is the existence of sufﬁcient evidence that would enable the panel to grant the
requested remedy in the absence of a rebuttal from the offending state.
An analysis of cases adjudicated upon by WTO panels demonstrates that they have
applied the same rule on burden of proof as enshrined under article 3 of DSU. In the Shirts
and Blouses case, the USA implemented a transitional safeguard mechanism pursuant to
article 2 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). India instituted a case alleging
that the move violated ATC[9]. A WTO panel ruled that the burden of proving that the
USA’s safeguard measure had violated the ATC rested in India. The panel argued that it
was India’s duty to adduce legal and factual evidence to demonstrate that the safeguards
implemented by the USA violated article 2 of the ATC[9]. Furthermore, the panel argued
that it was India’s duty to demonstrate that the USA serious threat determination under
article 6 of ATC had no legal basis.
The argument of the panel seemed to be that the aggrieved state must not only adduce
evidence to support its claim but also adduce evidence to poke holes on any defense that the
offending party might raise. In the present scenario, India adduced evidence to support its
claim that it deserves a remedy, but it failed to adduce evidence to dislodge the USA claim
that it had implemented the safeguards pursuant to article 6 of the ATC.
The same view on burden of proof was conﬁrmed in the Beef Hormones case[10]. In that
case, the European Commission implemented a law prohibiting the importation of beef from
countries that are known to inject their cattle with certain growth hormones[10]. This ban
led to reaction from the USA and Canada because the two states believed that the law
violatedWTO rules[10].
The panel ruled that the initial burden of proving a claim under the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) rests on the aggrieved state
(Kurleka and Turunen, 2010). The panel argued that the scope of that burden was on the
state to adduce prima facie evidence to back the claim that the offending state’s conduct was
inconsistent with the rules enshrined under the SPS. The panel further argued that the
alleged violation breach of the SPS must identify the speciﬁc provision or provisions of that
agreement that the offending state had breached. The panel argued that once the offending
state has put forth a prima facie case, the burden will shift to the offending party. The panel,
therefore, concluded by stating that the burden of proof will fall on a party, irrespective of
whether it is the defendant or claimant, that claims a given issue or refutes it.
WTO panels have gone out of their way to guard against states that attempt to impose
new rules on BOP. In the Shirts and Blouses case, the Indian representatives attempted to
reject arguments that they present prima facie evidence because it was evident that the US
actions amounted to a violation of the ATC. However, the panel rejected this contention on
the basis of the view that an absurd situation would arise when a state’s claims would
automatically amount to proof that the alleged offending state. In addition, the panel stated
that the rule on the prima facie was clearly established under English common law.
The burden of proof concept plays an important role in ensuring that there is stability
and certainty under the international trade system. Member states relying on the system are
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aware that other states cannot take away some of the rights they enjoy under GATT 1994.
Whenever a member notices that its right has been infringed or nulliﬁed, it will be at liberty
to institute legal proceedings with the WTO. However, the legal dispute will become futile if
there is no clear evidence to support the claim. Another important aspect of the WTO is that
there is a presumption that one state party’s decision to breach the rules adversely affects
other states that are party to theWTO agreement. This implies that other states have a right
to institute the case against the individual state that violated theWTO agreement.
In certain instances, the actions of states can lead panels into difﬁcult situations that
might not have been contemplated by the DSU drafters. This is especially the case in
instances where the states in question opt to ﬂood the panel with evidence without due
regard to the rules on presentation of evidence. The Panel on Japan – Measures Affecting
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper is a classic case of a situation where states
deliberately decided to ignore existing rules and developed their own procedures of
presenting evidence.
In that case, the USA instituted a complaint against Japan and the latter instituted a
complaint against the USA. The two countries then decided to simultaneously offer evidence
to support their claims[11]. This led to an absurd outcome where the panel could not
determine what would happen when the two states put forth prima facie evidence and where
the burden would shift to. This outcome prompted the panel to criticize the two states for
relying on the American legal system where parties in dispute adduce as much evidence, as
they can to support their respective position. The panel argued that such tactics would
adversely affect the WTO panel system and contribute to its collapse[11]. This ruling
suggests that there are inherent weaknesses in the rules on burden of proof. These rules are
not effective and, as such, there is need for the development of a full proof system that can
effectively assign the burden of adducing evidence among parties to a dispute.
The nature of difﬁculties WTO panels face in deﬁning burden of proof in the cases they
are handling has been demonstrated in the wide array of cases that on the WTO agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). To be more speciﬁc, panels have experienced
difﬁculties in deﬁning the scope of the concept of burden of proof as relates to the issue of
2(4) of the TBT. Article 2(4) of the TBT expressly mandates member states to use
internationally accepted standards when deﬁning the technical regulations that will
determine the entry of goods into their country. The article states that the rule on technical
standards will be ousted when it would be an inappropriate and ineffective strategy for the
achievement of a state party’s legitimate objectives.
TheWTO panel has been experiencing challenges in determining the scope of the burden
of proof in dispute arising from this provision. In theEC – Sardines case, the panel ruled that
the burden of proving that a given restriction did not amount to an international standard
rested with the party with access to information on policies that led to the decision, rather
than the complainant[12]. In that case, the European Community had argued that the burden
of proving that the Codex standard was an international standard within the meaning of
article 2(4) rested on Peru because it was the party that was asserting its inconsistency[12].
However, the panel overruled this view by arguing that the burden of proof rested with the
European Community because Peru was not in a position to clearly spell out the legitimate
objectives that prompted the European Community to implement the Codex restriction[13].
The panel also argued that the burden rested on the European Communities because it was
in a better position to clearly outline the factors that made the restriction consistent with the
international standard.
The European Communities appealed this decision and the Appellate Body ruled in its
favor by arguing that the burden fell on the complainant. It argued that that burden should
Burden and
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be borne by the party arguing that a given restriction is inconsistent with article 2(4) of the
TBT agreement. The Appellate Body argued that the presence of provisions in the TBT
agreement providing adequate avenues of access to information on the objectives that a
government or regional body will achieve when it implements technical regulation.
The divergence between the rulings of the panel with the original jurisdiction on the
issue and the Appellate Body suggests that there was confusion in the application of the
burden of proof concept. On the one hand, the panel felt that Peru could not effectively prove
an issue that was ostensibly within the custody of the European Community and, as such, it
argued that the European Community had the burden of proof. It made this ruling despite
the knowledge that Peru was the party with the greatest risk of loss in the event that it failed
to adduce evidence. It is highly probable that the panel made that decision because of its
assumption that the rule on burden of proof being on the party with the greatest risk of loss
would have occasioned an injustice in the circumstances before it.
On the other hand, the Appellate Body had different considerations when it overruled the
panel. The Appellate Body made its decision on a strict interpretation of the law. The
Appellate Body argued that the burden of proof must always rest with the party who is at
the greatest risk of loss in the event that no evidence is adduced. The Appellate Body
considered other relevant provisions of the TBT and argued that there were enough
safeguards for ensuring that parties with burden of proof have access to all the evidence
they require to prove support their claim. This move seemed to suggest that the Appellate
Body would have ruled in favor of Peru if there were no provisions that would have given it
access to the documents it required to prove its case. The absence of clarity is an indication
that panels are facing challenges in their attempt to incorporate the burden of proof concept
into their arguments. It is highly probable that the main factor accounting for this state of
affairs could be the absence of a provision that clearly outlines how the WTO Panels will
allocate the burden of proof in any given case.
5. Burden of proof in common law
The cases analyzed above demonstrated that the concept of burden of proof is straight
forward, but it might pose a challenge in its application. An analysis of literature on the
possible causes of the difﬁculty demonstrates that it arises from parties’ confusion
regarding their respective roles in the process of adducing evidence (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 22).
Parties are no longer aware of their evidentiary burden, and the result in certain cases like
the one between Japan and the USA is that the parties might just decide to sit on their laurels
and wait for the panel to make a determination on the decision that is the most credible. The
main cause for this state of affair is the difﬁculty inWTO litigators’ attempts to reconcile the
rules of civil law systems and rules under common law systems (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 227).
Under common law system, the phrase burden of proof has two meanings. First, it denotes
the rule that the party with the risk of losing the case in the absence of evidence is the one
who bears the responsibility of adducing the evidence (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 22). Second, the
phrase “burden of proof” denotes the division of labor that arises when a party adduces
sufﬁcient evidence for the jury or judge to rule if the other party does not produce sufﬁcient
evidence to rebut the claims (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 22). This second aspect of the deﬁnition is
what is widely referred to as the prima facie case, and it plays an important role in deﬁning
the concept of burden of proof under the common law system.
The system under the second aspect of the common law deﬁnition of burden of proof is
that there is no clear rule on the level of evidence that a party should adduce. In most cases,
the party to a dispute merely adduces evidence that is capable of sustaining a trial and the
courts call on the other party to rebut the claims (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 22). Although common
IJLMA
59,6
1226
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f S
ha
rja
h A
t 0
3:5
5 1
1 D
ece
mb
er 
20
17
 (P
T)
law decisions clearly stipulate that the prima facie case requires the offended party to
present evidence that is sufﬁcient for him to obtain a ruling in his favor, courts operating
under the common law system have generally tended to rule that a prima facie case has been
established in situations where the aggrieved party adduces evidence that is capable of
sustaining a trial, but is insufﬁcient to obtain a favorable ruling (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 22).
Another difﬁculty that arises from the second common law deﬁnition of burden of proof
is that it contradicts the ﬁrst deﬁnition. Under the second deﬁnition, burden of proof arises
when the aggrieved party to a dispute adduces evidence that seems plausible enough for a
judge to rule in his favor. Under the ﬁrst deﬁnition, burden of proof denotes the rule
requiring the party at risk of losing the case to adduce the requisite evidence. Under this
deﬁnition, there is a clear indication that there is no need for the establishment of a prima
facie case. The only thing that the court will consider is the party at risk and whether he or
she has exercised the burden so as to increase his/her chances of obtaining a favorable
ruling. This contradiction in the implication of the two-common law deﬁnition of burden of
proof is one of the factors that has led courts in common law states to make rulings that are
contradictory.
In J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw (1956) 1WLR 461, Lord Denning outlined the common law
position on burden of proof in his discussion about contracts of carriage. In that case,
Bradshaw had instituted a claim against J Spurling Ltd after it failed to deliver goods as
stipulated in a contract of carriage. Lord Denning, delivering the majority opinion, argued
that in a case involving the non-delivery of goods all the duty of the claimant is merely to
adduce evidence on the existence of a contract and adduce further evidence to demonstrate
that the defendant company had failed to deliver the goods as requested [J Spurling Ltd v
Bradshaw (1956) 1WLR 461, p. 466]. Once the claimant has adduced that evidence, it will be
upon the defendant to adduce evidence demonstrating that it was not at fault for the failure
to deliver or it failed to deliver but it is exempt from any claims by virtue of a clause in the
contract of carriage [J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw (1956) 1WLR 461, p. 466].
The Glendarroch case is another common law case in which the reasoning of the judge
on the concept of burden of proof contradicted that of Lord Denning (The Glendarroch,
1984). In that case, a company failed to deliver goods to the intended customers because
the ship transporting the goods sunk in the sea because it was unseaworthy. Thus, the
fact related to non-delivery of goods and the question under consideration was the burden
of proof in such instances. Lord Esher, delivering a unanimous verdict on behalf of the
other judges, argued that there was a contract of carriage and the defendant company
failed to deliver the goods that were subject of that contract. Thereafter, the defendant
company will have to rebut the claimant’s contentions by adducing evidence that bring it
prima facie within an exception (The Glendarroch, 1984). If the court is satisﬁed with the
claim, the burden of proof would shift back to the claimant to demonstrate that so that he
can disprove the company’s arguments (The Glendarroch, 1984).
An analysis of these two common law cases demonstrates that there are glaring
differences in the courts application of the concept. In the case of J Spurling v Bradshaw, the
court relied heavily on the rule that states that the burden of adducing evidence rests
squarely on the doorstep of the individual with the highest risk of losing the case (Treitel
et al., 2011).
In the second case of The Glendarroch, the judge based his arguments on the second
deﬁnition of burden of proof. It is particularly interesting how the judge argued that once the
claimant had proved that there was a contract of carriage and the defendant failed to deliver
the goods, it was upon the defendant to adduce prima facie evidence that the failure to
deliver was not his fault because the cause of the failure was one of the exceptions permitted
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within the contract. This use of the prima facie rule is unique because the judge required the
individual with access to the evidence – rather than the individual with the highest risk of
losing – to present prima facie evidence to support his claim that the cause of the failure was
part of the exceptions envisaged in the contract (Treitel et al., 2011). The contradictory
nature in which the court applied the burden of proof concept is one of the factors that have
prompted scholars to doubt the applicability of the prima facie concept in WTO
proceedings.
The common law practice of developing a prima facie standard of proof in which panels
thoroughly assess the evidence to determine whether a state has a case is erroneous. As
noted in the foregoing paragraphs, the practice even goes against the literal meaning of the
term prima facie. The practice even goes against the common law practice on prima facie
cases where courts decided it on the basis a standard referred to as balance of probabilities.
The “balance of probabilities” concept referred to a situation in which the courts would
assess the merits of the case and decide whether on the face of it or on the assessment of
different possibilities the claimant had a cause of action. When one compares that practice to
the present WTO practice in which panels conduct thorough analysis of the merits of an
aggrieved state’s claim, then it becomes clear that the standard of proof that the WTO
panels are relying on is much stringent than the one applied in common law courts. The
standard of proof is also much more stringent than the literal meaning of the term prima
facie. There is, therefore, need for WTO panels to develop a prima facie standard that is
equivalent to the prima facie standard envisaged at common law and the prima facie
standard that is closer to the general meaning of the phrase.
6. Burden of proof in civil law
Burden of proof in civil law jurisdictions pursues the same direction as the one outlined in
the ﬁrst deﬁnition on burden of proof in common law. Under civil law, the duty of adducing
evidence rests on the party who will be at the greatest risk of failure. In essence, it rests on
the complaining party and, as such, the party must adduce evidence to back up his claim
that a give set of facts is the correct state of affairs (Pﬁtzer and Sabune, 2009). This
understanding of the concept of burden of proof is markedly different from the
understanding of the concept under the second deﬁnition at common law where the courts
placed a burden of production on one of the parties to the case. It is also different from the
WTO system where panels rely heavily on the burden of production to undermine
aggrieved states’ capacity to present their respective cases.
The representation of the concept of burden of proof under the German system provides
an apt illustration of how civil law countries approach the concept. In Germany, the law
clearly states that a complainant’s production of evidence will not in any way discharge
him/her from the obligation of satisfying the burden of proof (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 242). In
other words, the burden of proof rests on the complainant throughout the case, and there is
no instance where the burden will shift to the defendant, with the result being that the party
at fault is found guilty or asked to produce compensation because he/she failed to adduce
adequate evidence to rebut the presented claims.
The burden of proof concept also rests on the notion that the individual who will win
when there is no conclusive evidence cannot decide on the nature of evidence that will be
adduced. If, for instance, the defendant agrees that he killed the plaintiff, but killed on the
ground of self-defense, the court will not give him the opportunity of solving the question on
whether it was self-defense because of the perception that he is the individual who will win
in the event that there is inconclusive evidence. As such, the court will request the other
party to adduce the evidence to demonstrate that the defendant not only killed the deceased
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but also that he did it without any form of provocation or that the provocation did not
warrant such an outcome (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 242). Therefore, the issue under civil law is not
for the claimant to prove anything; it is for the claimant to persuade the judge. Because the
claimant bears the greatest risk of failure on the issue at hand, he will have the duty to
persuade the judge on all elements of the case (Pauwelyn, 1998, p. 233). Further, it is
important to note that the success of a case does not always depend on how a party
persuades the judge; it depends on the judges’ investigation of the facts. Judges have a duty
to investigate the issue so as to determine whether the persuasion is accurate or it is faulty.
One of the most peculiar aspects of the burden of proof concept in civil jurisdictions is
that the parties will adduce evidence simultaneously throughout the proceedings (Barceló,
2009). In common law jurisdictions, parties can exercise their respective duties to exercise
their burden of adducing evidence in turns. The case commences with the complainant
adducing evidence and the defendant or respondent adduces evidence after the court rules
that the plaintiff has adduced concrete evidence. In contrast, civil law jurisdictions do not
have similar procedures when it comes to issues related to burden of proof (Barceló, 2009).
Parties to a dispute can exercise their respective burdens any time when there is need for
them to refute or prove allegations. This exercise of the burden of proof makes the civil law
jurisdictions markedly different from the common law jurisdiction and has been highlighted
as one of the factors that make civil law cases stand out. For instance, under German law,
the plaintiff will only be called upon to adduce evidence when the facts under issue are in
dispute. When the parties outline their agreement about a given fact, the court will not call
either of them forward to adduce evidence.
The court will only call upon the parties in dispute to adduce evidence when the facts
have been contested. Thus, when a party argues that adduces evidence to prove that the
defendant trespassed into his property, the judge will immediately call upon the opposite
party to refute the evidence. The judge will ask the opposing party the type of evidence he
has to refute the allegations. This system is known throughout the legal circles in Germany
as Beweisfuhrungslast (Barceló, 2009). This is markedly different from the common law
system where the court assesses the merits of the evidence prior to calling upon the
defendant to refute it. In common law systems, there are no rules on prima facie evidence. In
the common law concept of burden of production, the courts will test whether the adduced
evidence is sufﬁcient to merit it to call upon the other party to produce rebutting evidence.
Thus, the courts will only call on the defendant to adduce evidence when there is a clear
suggestion that the burden has been sufﬁciently addressed. In the German Beweisfuhrungslast
system, the focus of the court will be on the plaintiff’s willingness to provide evidence (Barceló,
2009). As long as the plaintiff underscores his willingness to provide evidence, the court will
accept it and will call on the other party to respond to the claims (Barceló, 2009). The court will
not concern itself about the chances of the claimant winning the case; it will only focus on
whether the plaintiff wants to produce the evidence.
7. The prima facie standard
WTO panels borrowed the prima facie model from the common law system, but their
application of the rule is markedly different from the manner in which common law judges
applied it (Grando, 2009). The ﬁrst time that a WTO panel applied the prima facie concept
was in the Shirts and Blouses Case where a common law state (India) argued that it was
applicable under the WTO rules[14]. The second time the rule became applicable was in the
Hormones Case when the WTO Appellate Body attempted to deﬁne it. In the case, the
Appellate Body argued that the prima facie case was present in cases where the absence of
contrary evidence forces the panel, as a matter of law, to decide in favor of the complainant
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who has presented the prima facie evidence[15]. This deﬁnition demonstrated that theWTO
Appellate Body was adopting the common law deﬁnitions of the concepts of prima facie
case. While the panel’s move to deﬁne the prima facie concept was commendable, it failed in
one respect. The Appellate Body failed to clearly point out the degree of persuasion that
claimants must demonstrate before the panel analyzing the case can argue that they have
established a prima facie case. This situation has been compounded by the fact that several
WTO panel rulings after the Hormones case have held that there is no precise prima facie
standard[16]. The prima facie standard will vary from one panel to another depending on
the set of unique facts under consideration. Such rulings demonstrate that there is no clear
agreement among panels on the factors that constitute the prima facie standard. The
absence of a clear agreement leads one to wonder why the Appellate Body in the Hormones
Case decided to outline the deﬁnition of the term prima facie without outlining the nature of
arguments or evidence that would be considered as constituting the prima facie evidence.
The absence of a clear deﬁnition of the prima facie case is an indication that there is no
deﬁnition of the prima facie standard (Grando, 2009, p. 108). The act of merely recounting
what a prima facie case entails does not in any way provide a concrete deﬁnition of the
phrase if there is still need for additional facts on what constitutes the prima facie standard.
For the prima facie case to have a clear deﬁnition, WTO panels must clearly deﬁne the
factors that constitute the prima facie standard.
Despite the absence of a WTO case that clearly outlines the prima facie standard, an
analysis of recent WTO cases suggests that there is a pattern in which WTO panels are
using thorough assessment of evidence as the prima facie standard. Unlike in the common
law where courts assess the veracity of the prima facie evidence on the basis of their ﬁrst
impression of the presented facts, WTO dispute settlement panels are making decisions on
prima facie on the basis of a thorough analysis of the evidence that the aggrieved party has
presented. The panel rulings demonstrate that they are clumping down on cases where the
aggrieved state fails to adduce concrete evidence. The US – Section 211 Appropriations Act
Case is an example of a case where a WTO panel attempted to outline the prima facie
standard[17]. In that case, the panel argued that the task at hand was for the aggrieved party
to present evidence that was cogent enough to raise a presumption in support of its claim
and the panel’s duty was to critically review the presented evidence to determine whether
challenged state conduct was clearly inconsistent with WTO rules. The use of the phrase
“critical review” highlights the clear pattern in which WTO panels are inventing a prima
facie standard in which they seek to determine the merits of the case instead of seeking to
clearly determine whether the facts and evidence presented can sustain a case. In essence,
the panel’s argument suggests that they always attempt to try the case even before the
offending state is called in to answer the claim.
Korea Alcoholic Beverages Case is another example of a case in which the panel
conducted a stringent analysis of the evidence presented in its quest to determine whether
the aggrieved state had established a prima facie case[18]. In that case, the issue under
determination was whether imported and Korean-produced beverages were substitutes or
direct competitors18. The Korean Government had implemented a policy in which it slapped
a higher import duty on imported alcoholic beverages. The Korean Government argued that
they did that because imported alcoholic beverages were substitutes and did not compete
directly with the local alcoholic beverages18. However, the claimants argued that the move
violated WTO provisions because it amounted to giving local products a higher level of
preference than imported products. The panel assessed the presented evidence and found
that the claimants had presented evidence for certain alcoholic beverages – like vodka,
admixtures, liqueurs, cognac, brandies, gin, rum and whiskies – and decided against
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presenting other forms of evidence in support of a category of alcohol referred to as HS 2208.
That ﬁnding led the panel to argue that it will not assess claims based on the alcoholic
beverages within the HS 2208 category. The panel argued that it would only call upon the
offending state to respond to the claims related to the alcoholic beverages that had been
supported by clear evidence. Thus, the panel decided to call upon the Korean Government to
answer claims related to the alcoholic beverages that the claimant had provided evidence to
demonstrate that they were in direct competition with Korean manufacturer alcoholic
beverages.
In the Upland Cotton Case, further evidence of the stringent pattern of assessment of
prima facie case is demonstrated[19]. In that case, the USA implemented the FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Act of 2000[19]. Brazil was offended by the demands of the law and
instituted a case at the WTO in which it requested the panel to ﬁnd that article 8 and article
10.1 of the USA statute violated article 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In the
case, the panel assessed the evidence presented with this claim and found that certain
aspects of the claim were missing[20]. The panel concluded that Brazil had not presented
evidence that was concrete enough for the tribunal to back their case that the highlighted
provisions of USA law had violatedWTO rules. The panel, therefore, dismissed the case and
argued that it could not analyze the case because the aggrieved state did not present
sufﬁcient evidence to demonstrate to the panel how US laws contributed to the violation of
WTO rules.
In the Gambling Case, the same issue of the absence of cogent evidence to support a
prima facie case arose[21]. In that case, several US states enacted and implemented laws
forcing corporations from Antigua to pay taxes in the USA for all online gambling
businesses in the USA Antigua brought in a claim against the USA on the ground that the
eight states had violated article XVI of the GATT. Initially, the panel assessed the case and
found that there was prima facie evidence. Based on that assessment, the panel concluded
that the USA had a case to answer on all the issues that Antigua raised[21].
The USA appealed that ruling and argued that the case should be dismissed because
Antigua did not present evidence to back up its claim that Article XVI had been violated. In
fact, the Appellate Body ruled in favor of the USA by arguing that Antigua did not present
sufﬁcient evidence to demonstrate that US laws were inconsistent with article XVI of the
GATT. The Appellate Body argued that it was erroneous for the panel to assess these laws
when there was a clear indication that Antigua had not expressly demonstrated how the
state laws had violated Article XVI of the GATT[21]. The essence of this ruling was that, in
the opinion of the Appellate Body, Antigua had not established a prima facie case.
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body did not clearly specify the nature of evidence that
would constitute a violation of Article XVI of the GATT. This failure to specify meant that a
state faced with similar facts in future would experience the same challenges because there
are no guidelines on prima facie standards. In that case, the Appellate Body stated that such
a case required additional evidence to bring forth a prima facie case.
The Appellate Body made that ruling even when the available evidence suggested that
US states had violated the rights of Antigua (Barceló, 2009, p. 44). The original WTO panel
found that the challenged state laws were in contravention of Article XVI of GATT and
requested the USA to remove the offending provisions from its laws. The takeaway from all
the reviewed cases is that panels have not developed a prima facie standard, but their
rulings suggest that panels have interpreted the requirement for the establishment of a
prima facie case in a strict manner. While this strict strategy is good by compelling
aggrieved parties to deliver concrete evidence, it may create hardship for parties who do not
have access to evidence or might experience difﬁculties in determining the nature of
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evidence that will eventually lead to the prima facie case. Most of the cases outlined in this
section of the paper had a strong evidence for states to support their claims, but they failed
in the initial hurdles related to establishment of a prima facie case (Barceló, 2009). Such a
high failure rate demonstrates that the present rule on prima facie cases is ineffective. There
is, therefore, a need for stakeholders to adopt a new rule on the subject.
8. Conclusion
The objective of the article was to critically evaluate the burden of proof concept under the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The DSU does not explicitly regulate how to allocate
the burden of proof, but panels and the AB needed to address that issue early in their
history. When instituting disputes under the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, parties
must adhere to the rules set out in article 3(7) and article 3(8) of the DSU. According to the
DSU, any member state instituting the action must consider the merits of their case and
determine whether it will be fruitful. The primary objective of the DSU is to ensure prompt
and fruitful resolution of disputes. Although provisions of the DSU do not clearly outline the
prima facie case, the analysis indicates that it requires all aggrieved parties to establish a
prima facie case before the case can become the subject of a panel hearing. This rule implies
that panels will have the responsibility of dismissing frivolous disputes or disputes whose
evidence is so insufﬁcient that it does not warrant an award in favor of the aggrieved party.
An analysis of the concept demonstrates that it is in need of reform as aggrieved states are
losing cases because of their inability to establish a prima facie case.
There is a need for the WTO to change the current rules on prima facie evidence and
adopt burden of proof concept that strikes the balance between the positive aspects of the
common law burden of proof concept and civil law burden of proof concept. In essence, there
is a need to adopt a burden of proof standard that assesses evidence on the basis of
preponderance of the available evidence rather than on the basis of a party’s failure to
adduce evidence to back up or dispute a claim. Introduction of such a concept will ensure
that WTO panels assess evidence in a manner that protects the interests of both the
claimant and the defendant state.
The dilemma facing the WTO might be understandable. It is true that it is not possible
for the WTO panels to formulate a precise deﬁnition of the phrase “prima facie” and
determine the appropriate standard of proof because the facts of one case and the
circumstances of parties in a given case varies. However, WTO dispute settlement panels
have the power to determine the general nature of circumstances that would constitute a
prima facie case. The WTO dispute settlement panels can decide to use the literal meaning
of prima facie and consider it as the basis for their decisions. An analysis of the literal
meaning of prima facie demonstrates that it means “on the face of it”. Using this literal
meaning implies that the panel assessing the merits of a case will assess whether the
evidence that a state has adduced leads can, on the face of it, sustain a case. Thus, WTO
panels can base their decisions on their ﬁrst impression of the evidence provided, rather
than on a careful analysis of that evidence. Such a move will permit the panel to dispense
justice in a manner that is fair to all parties. It will also bring the present practice of issuing
decisions based upon thorough analysis of evidence to an end.
The development of the new meaning does not imply that the WTO should prescribe a
precise deﬁnition of the phrase. It merely implies that the WTO must develop a prima facie
standard that is agreeable to all parties to a dispute. Further, it implies that panels must
develop a prima facie standard that brings justice to all parties rather than one of the parties
to a dispute. Under the present prima facie standards, WTO dispute settlement panels have
the power to determine the cases whose facts merit a prima facie categorization and the
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cases whose facts do not merit. However, there are no guidelines on the strategies that a
panel will use to rank a given case as prima facie and another case as not constituting prima
facie. As such, states presenting their claims to panels are often left disheartened whenever a
panel rules that the evidence they have presented has not met the prima facie standard.
Notes
1. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1244, article 3(7).
2. For review on the two approaches and the drawbacks of the GATT 1947 dispute mechanism, see
Shell (1995). See also Koh (1987) and Young (1995).
3. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1244, article 3(7), article 2(1).
4. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations,
Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.
M. 1244, article 3(7), article 2(1), Article 3(2).
5. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations,
Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.
M. 1244, article 3(7), article 2(1), Article 3(2), Article 3(3).
6. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations,
Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.
M. 1244, article 3(7), article 2(1), Article 3(2), Article 3(3), Article 3(8).
7. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1244, article 3(7), article 7(1).
8. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, in the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1244, article 3(7), article 7(1), article 3(8).
9. See USA – Measures Aﬀecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Report of
the Appellate Body, April 25, 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R.
10. See Report of the Appellate Body, EC – Measures concerning meat and meat products
(hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-1997-4.
11. See Panel Report, Japan – Measures Aﬀecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/
DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998: IV, 1779.
12. See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, WT/
DS231/AB/R, June 26, 2002, paragraph 282.
13. See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, WT/
DS231/AB/R, June 26, 2002, paragraph 282, at paragraphs 277, 282.
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14. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures aﬀecting imports of woven wool shirts and
blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr. 1, adopted May 23, 1997, DSR 1997:I, 323.
15. See: Appellate Body Report, European communities – Measures concerning meat and meat
products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted February 13, 1998, 135 at
paragraph 104.
16. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected customs matters, WT/DS315/AB/
R, adopted 11 December 2006 at paragraph 266. See also Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Trade Descriptions of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted October 23, 2002 at
paragraph 270; Panel Report, United States – Measures aﬀecting the cross-border supply of
gambling and betting services, WT/DS285/R, adopted April 20, 2005 at paragraph 6. 12.
17. See Panel Report, USA – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R,
adopted February 1, 2002 at paragraph 8.19
18. See Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on alcoholic beverages, WT/DS75/R, ADOPTED February 17,
1999 at paragraph 10.57.
19. See Panel Report, USA – Subsidies on upland cotton, WT/DS267/R and Corr. 1, adopted March
21, 2005 at paragraph 7.
20. See Panel Report, USA – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R and Corr. 1, adopted March
21, 2005 at paragraph 8.
21. See Appellate Body Report, USA – Measures Aﬀecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Service, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted April 20, 2005 at paragraph 154.
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